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Secret Key Generation over Noisy Channels
with Correlated Sources
Germa´n Bassi, Member, IEEE, Pablo Piantanida, Senior Member, IEEE, and
Shlomo Shamai (Shitz), Fellow Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper investigates the problem of secret key
generation over a wiretap channel when the terminals observe
correlated sources. These sources are independent of the main
channel and the users overhear them before the transmission
takes place. A novel achievable scheme is proposed, and its
optimality is shown under certain less-noisy conditions. This
result improves upon the existing literature where the more
stringent condition of degradedness is required. Furthermore,
numerical evaluation of the proposed scheme and previously
reported results for a binary model are presented; a comparison
of the numerical bounds provides insights on the benefit of the
novel scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE WIRETAP channel, introduced by Wyner [2], is thebasic model for analyzing secrecy in wireless communi-
cations. In this model, the transmitter, named Alice, wants to
communicate reliably with Bob while keeping the transmitted
message –or part of it– secret from an eavesdropper, named
Eve, overhearing the communication through another channel.
Secrecy is characterized by the amount of information that
is not leaked, which can be measured by the equivocation
rate –the remaining uncertainty about the message at the
eavesdropper. The secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel
is thus defined as the maximum transmission rate that can
be attained with zero leakage. In their influential paper [3],
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner determine the rate-equivocation region of
a general broadcast channel with any arbitrary level of security,
which also establishes the secrecy capacity of the wiretap
channel. These schemes guarantee secrecy by exploiting an
artificial random noise that saturates the eavesdropper’s de-
coding capabilities.
On the other hand, Shannon [4] shows that it is also possible
to achieve a positive secrecy rate by means of a secret key.
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Fig. 1. System model for the problem of secret key generation.
Alice and Bob can safely communicate over a noiseless public
broadcast channel as long as they share a secret key. The
rate of this key, however, must be at least as large as the
rate of the message to attain zero leakage. The main question
that arises in this scenario is therefore: how do the legitimate
users safely share the secret key? The answer is that the users
should not communicate the key itself, which would then
be compromised. Instead, they should only convey enough
information to allow themselves to agree upon a key without
disclosing, at the same time, any relevant information about
it to the eavesdropper (for further discussion the reader is
referred to [5], [6]).
In this work, we study the problem of secret key generation
over a wiretap channel with correlated sources at each termi-
nal. These sources are assumed to be independent of the main
channel and there is no additional public broadcast channel of
finite or infinite rate, as seen in Fig. 1. It is assumed that each
node acquires the n-sequence observation of its corresponding
source before the communication begins.
A. Related Work
Maurer [7] and Ahlswede and Csisza´r [8] are among the
first to study the use of correlated observations available at the
legitimate users as a means to agree upon a key. In addition
to the correlated observations, the terminals may communicate
over a public broadcast channel of infinite capacity to which
the eavesdropper has also access. Two models are proposed
in [8]: the “source model”, where the users observe correlated
random sources controlled by nature, and the “channel model”,
where the users observe inputs and outputs of a noisy channel
controlled by one of the users. In [9], Csisza´r and Narayan
study the first model but assume that the public broadcast
channel has finite capacity and there is a third “helper” node
who is not interested in recovering the key but rather helping
Alice and Bob. The same authors also analyze the channel
model with only one [10] or with multiple channel inputs [11].
2Capacity results are presented in [9]–[11] assuming that there
is only one round of communication over the public channel.
General inner and outer bounds for both source and channel
models with interaction over the public channel are introduced
by Gohari and Anantharam in [12], [13].
More recently, Khisti et al. [14] investigate the situation
where there is no helper node, the users communicate over
a wiretap channel, and a separate public discussion channel
may or may not be available. The simultaneous transmission
of a secret message along with a key generation scheme using
correlated sources is analyzed by Prabhakaran et al. [15].
The authors obtain a simple expression that reveals the trade-
off between the achievable secrecy rate and the achievable
rate of the secret key. The corresponding Gaussian chan-
nel with correlated Gaussian sources but independent of the
channel components is recently studied in [16]. Closed form
expressions for both secret key generation and secret message
transmission are derived. On the other hand, Salimi et al. [17]
consider simultaneous key generation of two independent users
over a multiple access channel with feedback, where each user
eavesdrops the other. In addition, the receiver can actively
send feedback, through a private noiseless (or noisy) link, to
increase the size of the shared keys.
The authors of [14]–[16] do not assume interactive com-
munication, i.e., there is only one round of communication.
Salimi et al. [17], however, allow the end user to respond once
through the feedback link. Other authors have analyzed key
generation schemes that rely on several rounds of transmis-
sions. Tyagi [18] characterizes the minimum communication
rate required to generate a maximum-rate secret key with r
rounds of interactive communication. He shows that this rate
is equal to the interactive common information (a quantity
he introduces) minus the secret key capacity. In his model,
two users observe i.i.d. correlated sources and communicate
over an error-free channel. Hayashi et al. [19] study a similar
problem but consider general (not necessarily i.i.d.) source
sequences of finite length. Their proposed protocol attains
the secret key capacity for general observations as well as
the second-order asymptotic term of the maximum feasible
secret key length for i.i.d. observations. They also prove
that the standard one-way communication protocol fails to
attain the aforementioned asymptotic result. Courtade and
Halford [20] analyze the related problem of how many rounds
of public transmissions are required to generate a specific
number of secret keys. Their model assumes that there are
n terminals connected through an error-free public channel,
where each terminal is provided with a number of messages
before transmission that it uses to generate the keys.
As previously mentioned, the focus of the present work is on
sources that are independent of the main channel; nonetheless,
some works have addressed the general situation of correlated
sources and channels. Prior work on secrecy for channels with
state include Chen and Vinck’s [21] and Liu and Chen’s [22]
analysis of the wiretap channel with state. These works employ
Gelfand and Pinsker’s scheme [23] to correlate the transmitted
codeword with the channel state at the same time that it
saturates the eavesdropper’s decoding capabilities. A single-
letter expression of the secrecy capacity for this model is
still unknown, although a multi-letter bound is provided by
Muramatsu [24] and a novel lower bound is recently reported
in [25]. As a matter of fact, the complexity of this problem
also lies in the derivation of an outer bound that can handle
simultaneously secrecy and channels with state.
To the best of our knowledge, only a handful of works have
studied the problem of key generation for channels with state.
The previously mentioned result of Prabhakaran et al. [15]
is one of these examples. Zibaeenejad [26] analyzes a similar
scenario where there is also a public channel of finite capacity
between the users and he provides an inner and an outer bound
for this model. Although the inner bound is developed for
a channel with state, it is possible to apply it to the model
used in the present work, i.e., sources independent of the
main channel. However, some steps of the proof reported
in [26] appear to be obscure and a constraint seems to be
missing in the final expression; the resulting achievable rate
was recently shown in [27] to be in certain cases unachievable.
As a consequence, we have decided not to compare our inner
bound to this previously reported scheme.
The works found in the literature that are closely related to
the problem dealt here [14]–[17], [26] derive the equivocation
of their schemes using a weak secrecy condition. In line with
these works, we use the same measure in the analysis of our
proposed scheme; however, it can be shown that our strategy
also fulfills the strong secrecy criterion (see Remark 7) which
has become more frequent nowadays. Recent works on the
wiretap channel employ this approach, e.g., [28], [29], where
in particular [29] does not assume that the messages have a
uniform distribution.
Finally, it is worth noting that the problem of secure source
transmission with side information [30]–[32] is closely related
to the present work, since the reconstructed source may
serve as a key as long as it has been reliably and securely
transmitted. It is not surprising that some of the techniques
developed in those works may be found here as well.
B. Contributions and Organization of the Paper
In this work, we introduce a novel coding scheme (The-
orem 2) for the problem of secret key generation over a
wiretap channel with correlated sources at each terminal. The
correlated sources are assumed to be independent of the main
channel and, thanks to a previously reported outer bound [33],
this scheme is shown to be optimal (Propositions 1, 2, and 3)
whenever the channel and/or source components satisfy the
specific less-noisy conditions described in Table I. In contrast,
the proposed schemes in [14]–[17] were optimal only when
the stronger degradedness condition holds true for the channel
and source components.
The main improvement of our scheme with respect to the
literature is to introduce a two-layer codebook for describing
the source. Although a two-layer scheme is not a new tech-
nique for the “source model” (cf. [8, Thm. 1]), it introduces
considerable difficulty and has not been investigated in the
framework of the combined model of Fig. 1. Difficulty arises
in the derivation of Eve’s equivocation, as shown by Lemma 2
in Section V-F. However, a scheme that is developed with
3two description layers can achieve higher secret key rates than
those of a single-layer scheme.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides
some definitions and our previously reported outer bound. In
Section III, we first present the inner bound for the problem of
secret key agreement and then we enumerate the cases where
said achievable scheme is optimal. Section IV illustrates with
a binary example the improvement of the present work over a
previously reported scheme. In Section V, we give the detailed
proof of the inner bound. Finally, Section VI summarizes and
concludes the work.
Notation and Conventions
Throughout this work, we use the standard notation of [34].
Specifically, given two integers i and j, the expression [i : j]
denotes the set {i, i+1, . . . , j}, whereas for real values a and
b, [a, b] denotes the closed interval between a and b. We use
the notation x
j
i = (xi, xi+1, . . . , xj) to denote the sequence of
length j− i+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ j. If i = 1, we drop the subscript
for succinctness, i.e., xj = (x1, x2, . . . , xj). Lowercase letters
such as x and y are mainly used to represent constants or
realizations of random variables, capital letters such as X and
Y stand for the random variables in itself, and calligraphic
letters such as X and Y are reserved for sets, codebooks, or
special functions.
The set of nonnegative real numbers is denoted by R+.
The probability distribution (PD) of the random vector Xn,
pXn(x
n), is succinctly written as p(xn) without subscript
when it can be understood from the argument xn. Given
three random variables X , Y , and Z , if its joint PD can
be decomposed as p(xyz) = p(x)p(y|x)p(z|y), then they
form a Markov chain, denoted by X −
− Y −
− Z . The
random variable Y is said to be less noisy than Z w.r.t. X
if I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z) for each random variable U such that
U −
− X −
− (Y, Z); this relation is denoted by Y X Z .
Entropy is denoted by H(·) and mutual information, I(·; ·).
The expression [x]+ denotes max{x, 0}. Given u, v ∈ [0, 1],
the function h2(u) , −u log2 u − (1 − u) log2(1 − u) is the
binary entropy function and u ∗ v , u(1 − v) + v(1 − u).
We denote typical and conditional typical sets by T nδ (X) and
T nδ (Y |x
n), respectively.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Problem Definition
Consider the wiretap channel with correlated sources at
every node (A,B,E), as shown in Fig. 1. The legitimate users
(Alice and Bob) want to agree upon a secret key K ∈ K while
an eavesdropper (Eve) is overhearing the communication. Let
A, B, E , X , Y , and Z be six finite sets. Alice, Bob, and
Eve observe the random sequences (sources) An, Bn, and
En, respectively, drawn i.i.d. according to the joint distribution
p(abe) on A×B×E . Alice communicates with Bob throughm
instances of a discrete memoryless channel with input X ∈ X
and output Y ∈ Y . Eve is listening the communication through
another channel with input X ∈ X and output Z ∈ Z . This
channel is defined by its transition probability p(yz|x) and it
is independent of the sources’ distribution.
Definition 1 (Code): A (2nRk , n,m) secret key code cn for
this model consists of:
• a key set Kn , [1 : 2nRk ],
• a source of local randomness Rr ∈ Rr at Alice,
• an encoding function ϕ : An ×Rr → Xm,
• a key generation function ψa : An ×Rr → Kn, and
• a key generation function ψb : Bn × Ym → Kn.
The rate of such a code is defined as the number of channel
uses per source symbol m
n
.
Given a code, let K = ψa(A
n, Rr) and X
m = ϕ(An, Rr);
then, the performance of the (2nRk , n,m) secret key code cn
is measured in terms of its average probability of error
Pe(cn) , Pr{ψb(B
n, Y m) 6= K|cn} , (1)
in terms of the information leakage
Lk(cn) , I(K;E
nZm|cn) , (2)
and in terms of the uniformity of the keys
Uk(cn) , nRk −H(K|cn) . (3)
Definition 2 (Achievability):A tuple (η,Rk) ∈ R2+ is said to
be achievable for this model if, for every ǫ > 0 and sufficiently
large n, there exists a (2nRk , n,m) secret key code cn such
that
m
n
≤ η+ ǫ , Pe(cn) ≤ ǫ ,
1
n
L(cn) ≤ ǫ ,
1
n
U(cn) ≤ ǫ . (4)
The set of all achievable tuples is denoted by R⋆ and is
referred to as the secret key region.
B. Outer Bound
The following theorem gives an outer bound on R⋆, i.e., it
defines the region Rout ⊇ R⋆.
Theorem 1: An outer bound on the secret key region for
this channel model is given by
Rk ≤ max
p∈P
{
η
[
I(T ;Y )− I(T ;Z)
]
+ I(V ;B|U)− I(V ;E|U)
}
(5)
subject to
I(V ;A|B) ≤ η I(X ;Y ) , (6)
where P is the set of input probability distributions given by
P =
{
p(txyzuvabe) =
p(tx)p(yz|x)p(abe)p(v|a)p(u|v)
}
(7)
with |T | ≤ |X |, |U| ≤ |A|+ 1, and |V| ≤ (|A|+ 1)2.
Proof: Refer to Appendix A for details.
Theorem 1 shows that the secret key generated between
Alice and Bob has two components. The first two terms on
the r.h.s. of (5) represent the part of the key that is securely
transmitted through the noisy channel (given by the random
variable T ) as in the wiretap channel. On the other hand, the
last two terms on the r.h.s. of (5) characterize the part of
the key that is securely extracted from the correlated sources
(given by the random variables U and V ). Since the source and
4channel variables are independent in the model, it should not
be surprising that the variable T is independent of (U, V ).
However, given that the users need to agree on common
extracted bits from the source, the noisy channel imposes the
restriction (6) on the amount of information exchanged during
that agreement.
Remark 1: The calculation of the bounds (5) and (6)
is done using the probability distribution (7). However, we
note that (7) is an uncommon single-letter expression of the
source and channel variables since the sequences have different
lengths. This remark is also applicable to all the regions
presented in the sequel.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we first introduce a key generation scheme
for the aforementioned model that leads to a novel inner
bound for the secret key region (Theorem 2). We then study
some special cases where this scheme turns out to achieve the
(optimal) secret key region (Propositions 1, 2, and 3).
A. Inner Bound
The following theorem gives an inner bound on R⋆, i.e., it
defines the region Rin ⊆ R⋆.
Theorem 2: A tuple (η,Rk) ∈ R2+ is achievable if there
exist random variables U , V , Q, T , X on finite sets U , V , Q,
T , X , respectively, with joint distribution p(uvqtxyzabe) =
p(q|t)p(tx)p(yz|x)p(abe)p(v|a)p(u|v), which verify
Rk ≤ η
[
I(T ;Y |Q)− I(T ;Z|Q)
]
+ I(V ;B|U)− I(V ;E|U) (8)
subject to
I(U ;A|B) ≤ η I(Q;Y ) , (9a)
I(V ;A|B) ≤ η I(T ;Y ) . (9b)
Moreover, it suffices to consider sets U , V , Q, and T such
that |U| ≤ |A| + 2, |V| ≤ (|A|+ 1)(|A|+ 2), |Q| ≤ |X |+ 2,
and |T | ≤ (|X | + 1)(|X |+ 2).
Proof: Alice employs the two-layer description (U, V ) to
compress the source A and it transmits it through the two-
layer channel codeword (Q, T ). Each layer of the description
must fit in the corresponding layer of the channel codeword
according to (9). The achievable secret key rate (8) is a
combination of the secret bits transmitted through the noisy
channel in the manner of the wiretap channel and the secret
bits obtained by the reconstruction of the source at Bob. The
full proof is deferred to Section V.
Remark 2: The regions Rout and Rin do not coincide in
general. This is due to the presence of the condition (9a) in
the inner bound, and the looser condition (6) in the outer
bound with respect to (9b). We present in Section III-B a
few special cases where these differences disappear and both
regions coincide.
Remark 3: By setting U = ∅, the region in Theorem 2 recov-
ers the results in [14, Thm. 1 and 4], when the eavesdropper
has access to a correlated source, and [15, Thm. 2], when
there is no secret message to be transmitted. In these works,
there was only one layer to encode the source An while our
coding scheme allows for two layers, introducing considerable
difficulty in the derivation of Eve’s equivocation (see e.g. the
multiple binning stages in the proof and (40)). The advantage
of having two layers of description is that Theorem 2 can
potentially achieve higher secret key rates (see Section IV)
and it recovers the result of Csisza´r and Narayan [9] (see
Remark 8).
Remark 4: The region in Theorem 2 also recovers the
result in [35, Thm. 1], which was published after the original
submission of this manuscript. In that work, Alice and Bob
communicate over a public noiseless channel of rate R1 and a
secure noiseless channel of rate R2. The proposed achievable
scheme in [35] sends the codeword Q through the public
channel, i.e., I(Q;Y ) = R1, and the codeword T through the
secure channel, i.e., I(T ;Y |Q) = R2 and I(T ;Z|Q) = 0. The
reader may verify that, by using the aforementioned quantities
and η = 1, both regions are equal.
Remark 5: Theorem 2 improves upon our previous work
in [33, Sec. IV-A] since (9) replaces the more stringent
condition: I(V ;A|B) ≤ η I(Q;Y ).
Remark 6: The problem of key generation dealt with in the
present work is intimately connected to the problem of secure
source transmission with side information, at both receiver and
eavesdropper [31], [32], since the part of the source that can
be reliably and securely transmitted serves as key which is a
function of the source. It is thus not surprising that Theorem 2
bears a resemblance to our previous result in [32, Thm. 2].
Remark 7: Theorem 2 is obtained using the weak secrecy
and uniformity conditions in (4). However, employing the
method introduced in [36], we can show that the strong secrecy
and uniformity conditions, i.e., L(cn) ≤ ǫ and U(cn) ≤ ǫ, also
hold true. The proof relies on using l times a secret key code cn
to generate l independent keys. We then interpret these l keys
as l realizations of a random source in the “source model”,
which allows us to distill strong secret keys by means of a one-
way direct reconciliation protocol and privacy amplification
with extractors. These two steps involve the transmission of
additional information through the channel; nonetheless, the
cost of these additional channel uses is negligible compared
to the total transmission time for large l, m, and n. We omit
the details of the proof here due to the similarities with [37,
Sec. 4.5] and [33, App. B-C].
B. Optimal Characterization of the Secret Key Rate
The inner bound Rin is optimal under certain less-noisy
conditions in channel and/or source components. These special
cases are summarized in Table I.
1) Eve Has a Less Noisy Channel: If Eve has a less noisy
channel than Bob, i.e., Z X Y , the information transmitted
over the channel is compromised. Therefore, the amount of
secret key that can be generated only depends on the statistical
differences between sources.
Proposition 1: If Z X Y , a tuple (η,Rk) ∈ R2+ is
achievable if and only if there exist random variables U , V ,
5E AB B AE
Z X Y Rk = 0 Proposition 1
Y X Z Proposition 2 Proposition 3
TABLE I
REGIMES WHERE THEOREM 2 IS OPTIMAL. NO SECRET KEY IS
ACHIEVABLE IF Z X Y AND E AB.
X on finite sets U , V , X , respectively, with joint distribu-
tion p(uvabexyz) = p(u|v)p(v|a)p(abe)p(x)p(yz|x), which
verify
Rk ≤ I(V ;B|U)− I(V ;E|U) (10a)
subject to I(V ;A|B) ≤ η I(X ;Y ) . (10b)
Proof: Given the less-noisy condition on Eve’s channel,
i.e., I(T ;Y ) ≤ I(T ;Z) for any RV T such that T −
−X −
−
(Y Z), the bound (5) is maximized with T = ∅. On the other
hand, the region (10) is achievable by setting auxiliary RVs
Q = T = X in Rin.
Remark 8: The secret key capacity of the wiretap channel
with a public noiseless channel of rate R [9, Thm. 2.6] turns
out to be a special case of Proposition 1, where X = Y = Z
and defining η H(X) = η log |X | ≡ R.
2) Eve Has a Less Noisy Source: If Eve has a less noisy
source than Bob, i.e., E AB, the amount of secret key that
can be generated depends on the amount of secure information
transmitted through the wiretap channel.
Proposition 2: If E A B, a tuple (η,Rk) ∈ R2+ is
achievable if and only if there exist random variables T ,
X on finite sets T , X , respectively, with joint distribution
p(txyz) = p(tx)p(yz|x), which verify
Rk ≤ η
[
I(T ;Y )− I(T ;Z)
]
. (11)
Proof: Given the less-noisy condition on Eve’s source,
i.e., I(V ;B) ≤ I(V ;E) for any RV V such that V −
−
A −
− (BE), the bound (5) is maximized with U = V and
independent of the sources. The region (11) is achievable by
using the same auxiliary RVs in the inner bound as in the
outer bound.
Remark 9: The bound (11) is equal to the secrecy capacity
of the wiretap channel.
Remark 10: Even though the bound (11) becomes inde-
pendent of the sources sequences (An, Bn, En), we assume
n 6= 0, and thus the rate η is finite.
3) Bob Has a Less Noisy Channel and Source: If Bob has
a less noisy channel and source than Eve, i.e., Y X Z and
B AE, the lower layers of the channel and source codewords
are not needed any more.
Proposition 3: If Y X Z and B AE, a tuple (η,Rk) ∈
R
2
+ is achievable if and only if there exist random variables
V , X on finite sets V , X , respectively, with joint distribution
p(vabexyz) = p(v|a)p(abe)p(x)p(yz|x), which verify
Rk ≤ η
[
I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)
]
+ I(V ;B)− I(V ;E) (12a)
subject to I(V ;A|B) ≤ η I(X ;Y ) . (12b)
X = Y
0
1
Z
0
1
1− ζ
ζ
ζ
1− ζ
(a) Main channel.
A
0
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B
0
e
1
E
0
1
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ǫ
ǫ
1− ǫ
1− β
β
β
1− β
(b) BEC/BSC sources.
Fig. 2. System model for the wiretap channel with BEC/BSC sources.
Proof: Given the less-noisy conditions on Bob’s channel
and source, the bound (5) is maximized with U = ∅ and
T = X . The region (12) is achievable by also setting auxiliary
RVs U = Q = ∅ and T = X in the inner bound.
Remark 11: Proposition 3 extends the results from [14,
Thm. 4] and [15, Thm. 3] which assumed the more stringent
conditions of degradedness: A−
−B−
−E and X−
−Y −
−Z .
IV. SECRET KEY AGREEMENT OVER A WIRETAP
CHANNEL WITH BEC/BSC SOURCES
As mentioned in Remark 3, the inner bound introduced in
Section III-A employs two layers of description, and thus it
is an improvement over previously reported results. In this
section, we compare the performance of our achievable scheme
with that of [14] for a specific binary source and channel
model.
A. System Model
Consider the communication system depicted in Fig. 2. The
main channel consists of a noiseless link from Alice to Bob
and a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover proba-
bility ζ ∈
[
0, 12
]
from Alice to Eve (see Fig. 2a). Additionally,
the three nodes have access to correlated sources; in particular,
Alice observes a binary uniformly distributed source, i.e.,
A ∼ B
(
1
2
)
, which is the input of two parallel channels as
shown in Fig. 2b. Bob observes the output of a binary erasure
channel (BEC) with erasure probability β ∈ [0, 1], and Eve, a
BSC with crossover probability ǫ ∈
[
0, 12
]
. For simplicity, we
assume η = 1 in the sequel.
Remark 12: The sources (A,B,E) satisfy different prop-
erties according to the values of the parameters (β, ǫ) [38],
specifically:
• if 0 ≤ β < 2ǫ, E is a degraded version of B, i.e., A−
−
B −
−E;
6• if 2ǫ ≤ β < 4ǫ(1 − ǫ), B is less noisy than E, i.e.,
B AE; and,
• if 4ǫ(1− ǫ) ≤ β < h2(ǫ), B is more capable than E.
B. Performance of the Coding Scheme
The following proposition provides a simple expression of
the inner bound from Theorem 2. The expression is obtained
by simplifying the maximization process of the input distribu-
tion, and thus it might not be optimal. However, this suffices
to show the higher rates achieved by this scheme as we see
later.
Proposition 4: The tuple (η = 1, Rk) ∈ Rin if there exist
u, v, q ∈
[
0, 12
]
such that:
Rk ≤ (1 − β)
[
h2(v ∗ u)− h2(v)
]
− h2(v ∗ u ∗ ǫ)
+ h2(v ∗ ǫ) + h2(ζ) + h2(q)− h2(ζ ∗ q) , (13a)
subject to β
[
1− h2(v ∗ u)
]
≤ 1− h2(q) . (13b)
Proof: The bound (13) is directly calculated from (8)
and (9a) with the following choice of input random variables:
T = X , Q = X ⊕Q′, V = A⊕ V ′, and U = V ⊕ U ′. Here,
X ∼ B
(
1
2
)
, Q′ ∼ B(q), V ′ ∼ B(v), and U ′ ∼ B(u), and each
random variable is independent of each other and (A,B,E).
The condition (9b) in the inner bound becomes redundant with
the mentioned choice of input distribution.
As previously mentioned, we provide next the inner bound
presented in [14, Thm. 4]1 as a means of comparison. This
inner bound is similar to Theorem 2 but with only one layer
of description for the source A; thus, its achievable region is
denoted Rin-1L.
Proposition 5 ([14, Thm. 4]): The tuple (η = 1, Rk) ∈
Rin-1L if and only if
Rk ≤
[
h2(ǫ)− β
]+
+ h2(ζ) . (14)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 13: Proposition 5 is a special case of Proposition 4
with u = q = 12 , and v = 0 or v =
1
2 . As mentioned in
Remark 3, the inner bound [14, Thm. 4] is a special case of
our Theorem 2 with U = ∅ (thus u = 12 ). Moreover, given
that in this model the Markov chain X −
− Y −
−Z holds, the
channel codebook of Proposition 5 has only one layer (thus
q = 12 ). On the other hand, there are two layers of description
in Proposition 4, and whenever U 6= ∅ (i.e., u < 12 ), we
have that Q 6= ∅ (i.e., q < 12 ). This relationship is determined
by (13b).
We perform numerical optimization of the bound (13) for
different values of β while fixing ζ = 0.01 and ǫ = 0.05; the
results are shown in Fig. 3 along with the bound (14). We see
in the figure the advantage of having two layers of description
for the source A. Our proposed scheme, Proposition 4, attains
higher secret key rates than the scheme with only one layer
of description (Proposition 5) for intermediate values of β. It
is in this regime, when the source B is no longer less noisy
than E, that two layers of description are needed.
1Theorem 4 from [14] is actually a capacity result assuming that A−
B−
E
and X −
− Y −
− Z . In our present example, only the second Markov chain
holds independently of the value of the parameters β and ǫ, but this does not
invalidate the use of the inner bound.
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Fig. 3. Achievable secret key rates for the wiretap channel with BEC/BSC
sources, with ζ = 0.01 and ǫ = 0.05. In region A, A −
− B −
− E, while
in region B, B A E, and finally in region C, B is more capable than E.
The horizontal dotted line corresponds to the secrecy capacity of the main
channel, i.e., h2(ζ).
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We begin by presenting a high-level description of the
coding strategy before properly developing the proof. In this
scheme, the secret key is learned by extracting common bits
from the correlated sources and from exchanging other bits
through the noisy channel. In particular, Alice compresses
the source observation An using a two-layer source codebook
(determined by Un and V n). Alice then transmits the cor-
responding bin indices r1 and (r2, rp) to Bob with the aid
of a code for the wiretap channel. Using his side-information
Bn, Bob recovers the codewords Un and V n and he further
obtains the bin indices (r2, k1), where k1 is independent of
rp provided that the conditions of Lemma 2 (Section V-F) are
met. The key is finally generated using bits from the indices
k1 and k2, where the latter was sent over the noisy channel
along with r1, r2, and rp. We provide a detailed proof in the
following.
A. Codebook Generation
Let us define the quantity
Rf < (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q)− ǫf , (15)
and fix the following joint probability distribution:
p(qtxyzuvabe) =
p(q|t)p(tx)p(yz|x)p(u|v)p(v|a)p(abe) . (16)
Then, proceed as follows:
1) Randomly pick 2nS1 sequences un(s1) from T nδ (U) and
divide them into 2nR1 equal-size bins B1(r1), r1 ∈ [1 :
2nR1 ].
2) For each codeword un(s1), randomly pick 2
nS2 se-
quences vn(s1, s2) from T nδ (V |u
n(s1))
2 and divide
2As a matter of fact, the sequences vn(s1, s2) should be chosen from
T n
δ′
(V |un(s1)), δ < δ′, in order to assure that (un(s1), vn(s1, s2)) ∈
T n
δ′
(UV ) (see e.g. Conditional Typicality Lemma [34]). This remark also
applies to the generation of the channel codewords qm(·) and tm(·) in this
part of the proof. However, we omit this detail throughout the proof to simplify
the notation and ease the reading.
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Fig. 4. Multiple binning stages of the codewords vn(s1, s2), where each
circle represents a codeword. The fact that a codeword belongs to different
sub-bins B˜2 and B¯2 is shown through a black circle, which depicts the same
codeword.
them into 2nR2 equal-size bins B2(s1, r2), r2 ∈ [1 :
2nR2 ]. Furthermore, distribute the sequences inside each
bin in two different types of sub-bin:
• 2nRp equal-size sub-bins B˜2(s1, r2, rp), rp ∈ [1 :
2nRp ]; and,
• 2nRk1 equal-size sub-bins B¯2(s1, r2, k1), k1 ∈ [1 :
2nRk1 ].
Note that a sequence vn(s1, s2) belongs to sub-bins
B˜2(s1, r2, rp) and B¯2(s1, r2, k1) where rp and k1 are
independent. See Fig. 4 for a schematic representation.
3) Randomly pick 2n(R1+R2) sequences qm(r1, r2) from
T mδ (Q).
4) For each qm(r1, r2), randomly pick 2
n(Rp+Rk2+Rf ) se-
quences tm(r1, r2, rp, k2, rf ) from T
m
δ (T |q
m(r1, r2)).
5) Randomly distribute the set of 2n(Rk1+Rk2 ) indices
(k1, k2) into 2
nRk equal-size bins Bk(k), k ∈ [1 : 2nRk ].
B. Encoding
Given a sequence an, and the indices k2 and rf chosen
uniformly at random in [1 : 2nRk2 ] and [1 : 2nRf ], the encoder
proceeds as follows:
1) It looks for an index s1 ≡ sˆ1 such that (un(sˆ1), an) ∈
T nδ′ (UA). If more than one index is found, choose one
uniformly at random among them, whereas if there is
no such index, choose one uniformly at random in [1 :
2nS1 ]. The probability of not finding such an index is
arbitrarily small as n→∞ if δ′ < ǫ1 and
S1 > I(U ;A) + ǫ1 . (17)
2) Then, it looks for an index s2 ≡ sˆ2 such that
(vn(s1, sˆ2), a
n) ∈ T nδ′ (V A|u
n(s1)). If more than one
index is found, choose one uniformly at random among
them, whereas if there is no such index, choose one
uniformly at random in [1 : 2nS2]. The probability of
not finding such an index is arbitrarily small as n→∞
if δ′ < ǫ2 and
S2 > I(V ;A|U) + ǫ2 . (18)
3) Let B1(r1) and B˜2(s1, r2, rp) be the bins of un(s1) and
vn(s1, s2), respectively.
4) The encoder selects the codeword tm(r1, r2, rp, k2, rf ).
It then transmits the associated jointly typical sequence
xm ∼
∏m
i=1 p(xi|ti(r1, r2, rp, k2, rf )), generated on the
fly.
C. Decoding
Given a sequence bn and the channel output ym, the decoder
proceeds as follows:
1) It starts by looking for the unique set of indices
(r1, r2, rp, k2, rf ) ≡ (rˆ1, rˆ2, rˆp, kˆ2, rˆf ) such that(
qm(rˆ1, rˆ2), t
m(rˆ1, rˆ2, rˆp, kˆ2, rˆf ), y
m
)
∈ T mδ (QTY ) .
The probability of error in decoding can be made
arbitrarily small as (n,m)→∞ provided that
R1 +R2 +Rp +Rk2 +Rf < (η + ǫ)I(T ;Y )− δ ,
Rp +Rk2 +Rf < (η + ǫ)I(T ;Y |Q)− δ .
2) The decoder looks for the unique index s1 ≡ sˆ1 such
that un(sˆ1) ∈ B1(r1) and (un(sˆ1), bn) ∈ T nδ (UB). The
probability of error in decoding can be made arbitrarily
small as n→∞ provided that
S1 −R1 < I(U ;B)− δ . (19)
3) Then, it looks for the unique index s2 ≡ sˆ2 such
that vn(s1, sˆ2) ∈ B˜2(s1, r2, rp) and (vn(s1, sˆ2), bn) ∈
T nδ (V B|u
n(s1)). The probability of error in decoding
can be made arbitrarily small as n→∞ provided that
S2 −R2 −Rp < I(V ;B|U)− δ . (20)
D. Key Generation
According to the preceding steps and with increasing high
probability as (n,m) → ∞, Bob correctly decodes the
index k2 and both Alice and Bob possess the same sequence
vn(s1, s2) ∈ B¯2(s1, r2, k1). Therefore, they both agree on the
same secret key k, which is the bin where the pair (k1, k2)
belongs, i.e., (k1, k2) ∈ Bk(k).
E. Key Uniformity
Consider the following chain of inequalities:
H(K|C) = H(K1K2|C)−H(K1K2|CK) (21a)
≥ H(K1|C) + nRk2 − n(Rk1 +Rk2 −Rk) (21b)
≥ H(K1|CU
n)− n(Rk1 −Rk) (21c)
= H(V n|CUn)−H(V n|CUnK1)− n(Rk1 −Rk)
(21d)
≥ H(V n|CUn)− n(S2 −Rk1)− n(Rk1 −Rk) ,
(21e)
where
• (21b) follows from K2 being chosen uniformly in [1 :
2nRk2 ] and independently of K1, and that there are
2n(Rk1+Rk2−Rk) pairs (K1,K2) in each bin K;
• (21d) is due to K1 being a function of (V
n, C); and,
8• (21e) is due to the number of sequences V n asso-
ciated with sub-bin index K1 being 2
n(S2−Rk1 ), i.e.,
log
∑
r2
|B¯2(s1, r2, k1)| = n(S2 −Rk1).
Before continuing the analysis, we introduce the random
variable Υ, such that
Υ , 1{(Un, An) ∈ T nδ (UA)} . (22)
Moreover, in order to improve readability, we drop the index
from the codeword Un, and thus the codebook C is composed
of: Un ∈ T nδ (U) and V
n(s) ∈ T nδ (V |U
n), where s ∈ S ,
[1 : 2nS2 ]. Finally, we note that, conditioned on the codebook
C, the entropy of V n is given by the entropy of its index S.
Therefore,
H(V n|CUn) = H(S|CUn) (23a)
≥ H(S|CUnΥ) (23b)
≥ H(S|CUn,Υ = 1)(1− ǫ) , (23c)
where the last step is due to Pr{Υ = 1} ≥ 1− ǫ.
Now, for a specific codebook C = cn (which determines
the codeword Un = un), let us define the random variable Sc
with distribution
pSc , pS|C=cn,Un=un,Υ=1 . (24)
Therefore,
H(Sc) = H(S|C = cn, U
n = un,Υ = 1) , (25)
and
H(S|CUn,Υ = 1) = EC
[
H(Sc)
]
(26a)
=
∑
s∈S
EC
[
− pSc(s) log pSc(s)
]
(26b)
= |S|EC
[
− pSc(1) log pSc(1)
]
, (26c)
where the last step is due to the symmetry of the random code-
book generation and encoding procedure, i.e., the probability
pSc is independent of the specific value of the index. This is
addressed in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Let ε1, ε2, ξ > 0 and let χ be a function of the
codebook cn defined as
χ(cn) , 1
{∣∣pSc(1)− |S|−1∣∣ ≥ ε1 |S|−1} . (27)
Then, Pr{χ(C) = 1} ≤ ε2 for large n if S2 < H(A)− ξ.
Proof: This lemma is similar to the one introduced in [33,
Lemma 5] and its proof is reproduced in Appendix C for
completeness.
Using the previous lemma we may continue (26),
H(S|CUn,Υ = 1)
≥ |S|EC
[
− pSc(1) log pSc(1) | χ(C) = 0
]
(1 − ε2) (28a)
≥ (1− ε1)
[
log |S| − log(1 + ε1)
]
(1− ε2) (28b)
≥ n(S2 − ε
′) , (28c)
for some ε′ > 0. Putting together (21), (23), and (28), we
obtain
H(K|C) ≥ n(S2 − ε
′)(1 − ǫ)− n(S2 −Rk) ≥ n(Rk − ǫ
′) ,
(29)
for some ǫ′ > 0. Finally, the uniformity of the keys, as defined
in (3), averaged over all codebooks is
E[Uk(C)] = nRk −H(K|C) ≤ nǫ
′ , (30)
and thus the key is asymptotically uniform.
Remark 14: It is worth noting that the preceding steps show
that the probability of V n is almost uniformly distributed on
the codebook,
H(V n|CUn) ≥ n(S2 − ε
′)(1− ǫ) , (31)
which follows from (23) and (28). A lower bound onH(Un|C)
may be obtained using a similar analysis. Given that the
sequences Un and V n are divided randomly and indepen-
dently on equal-size bins and sub-bins, the bin and sub-bin
indices (e.g. rp) are also distributed almost uniformly on their
respective sets.
F. Key Leakage
We may first relate the entropy of K to that of (K1,K2)
as in (21),
H(K|CEnZm)
= H(K1K2|CE
nZm)−H(K1K2|CE
nZmK) (32a)
≥ H(K1K2|CE
nZm)− n(Rk1 +Rk2 −Rk) . (32b)
Then, consider the following chain of inequalities:
H(K1K2|CE
nZm)
≥ H(K1K2|CE
nZmr1r2)
= H(K2U
nV n|CEnZmr1r2)
−H(UnV n|CEnZmr1r2K1K2) (33a)
≥ H(K2U
nV n|CEnZmr1r2)−H(U
n|CEnr1)
−H(V n|CEnZmUnr2K1K2)
≥ H(K2U
nV n|CEnZmr1r2)− 2nǫn (33b)
= H(K2U
nV nAn|CEnZmr1r2)
−H(An|CEnZmUnV nK2)− 2nǫn (33c)
≥ H(K2A
n|CEnZmr1r2)−H(A
n|UnV nEn)− 2nǫn
≥ H(An|CEnZmr1r2K2) +H(K2|CE
nZmr1r2)
− n[H(A|UV E) + 2ǫn]
= H(An|CEnZmr1r2rpK2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Es
+ I(An; rp|CE
nZmr1r2K2) +H(K2|CE
nZmr1r2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Ec
− n[H(A|UV E) + 2ǫn] , (33d)
where
• (33a) is due to K1 being a function of (V
n, C);
• (33b) follows from Lemma 2 below; and,
• (33c) is due to (r1, r2) being functions of (U
n, V n, C).
Lemma 2: Let ǫn, δ, δ
′, ε1 > 0, then, given the codebook
generation and encoding procedure of the scheme,
H(Un|CEnr1) ≤ nǫn (34a)
9if S1 −R1 < I(U ;E)− δ, and
H(V n|CEnZmUnr2K1K2) ≤ nǫn (34b)
if S2−R2−Rk1 +Rf < I(V ;E|U)+ (η+ ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q)− δ
′
and Rp +Rf > (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q) + ε1.
Proof: See Appendix D.
In the last step of (33), we split up the equivocation into
two parts as in [32]. The “source” term Es writes:
Es = H(A
n|CEnr1r2rp) (35a)
= H(Anr2rp|CE
nr1)−H(r2rp|CE
nr1) (35b)
= H(An|CEnr1) +H(r2rp|CA
nEnr1)−H(r2rp|C)
+ I(r2rp;E
nr1|C) (35c)
≥ H(An|UnEn) +H(rp|CA
nEnr1r2)− n(R2 +Rp)
+ I(r2rp;E
n|Cr1) (35d)
≥ n[H(A|UE)− ε]− n(R2 +Rp) +H(rp|CA
nEnr1r2)
+ I(r2rp;E
n|Cr1) , (35e)
where
• (35a) follows from the Markov chain (AnEn) −
−
(Cr1r2rp)−
− (K2Zm);
• (35d) is due to the Markov chain (AnEn) −
− Un −
−
(r1C), the fact that the indices r2 and rp belong to sets
of cardinality 2nR2 and 2nRp , and the non-negativity of
mutual information; and,
• (35e) stems from the lower bound found on Lemma 3
below.
Lemma 3: Given the codebook generation and encoding
procedure of the scheme,
H(An|UnEn) ≥ n[H(A|UE)− ε] . (36)
Proof: Using well-known properties of typical sets, we
have
H(An|UnEn) = −
∑
∀(unanen)
p(unanen) log p(an|unen)
≥ −
∑
(unanen)∈T nδ (UAE)
p(unanen) log p(an|unen)
≥
∑
(unanen)∈T nδ (UAE)
p(unanen)n[H(A|UE)− ε(1)]
≥ (1− ε(2))n[H(A|UE)− ε(1)]
≥ n[H(A|UE)− ε(3)] ,
where in the last step we choose ε(3) large enough to have a
lower bound.
On the other hand, the “channel” term Ec writes:
Ec = H(rpK2|CE
nZmr1r2)−H(rp|CA
nEnZmr1r2K2)
= H(rpK2|CZ
mr1r2)− I(rpK2;E
n|CZmr1r2)
−H(rp|CA
nEnZmr1r2K2) . (37)
The first term on the r.h.s. of (37) corresponds to the equiv-
ocation (of the private message, given the common message
and the output of the channel) in the wiretap channel setting.
Following the arguments of [3, Sec. IV] and [39, Sec. 2.3],
together with constraint (15) and Remark 14, we can easily
prove the following lower bound3:
H(rpK2|CZ
mr1r2)
≥ n
[
Rp +Rk2 +Rf − (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q)− ε
′
]
, (38)
for sufficiently large n.
Gathering (32), (33), (35), (37), and (38), we have that
H(K|CEnZm)
≥ n
[
I(V ;A|UE)−Rk1 +Rk −R2 +Rf
− (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q)− ε′′
]
+ I(rp;Z
mK2|CA
nEnr1r2)
+ I(r2rp;E
n|Cr1)− I(rpK2;E
n|CZmr1r2) , (39)
for some ε′′ > 0. We now study the last two multi-letter terms
on the r.h.s. of (39):
I(r2rp;E
n|Cr1)− I(rpK2;E
n|CZmr1r2)
= I(r2rp;E
n|Cr1)− I(r2rpZ
mK2;E
n|Cr1)
+ I(r2Z
m;En|Cr1) (40a)
= −I(ZmK2;E
n|Cr1r2rp) + I(r2Z
m;En|Cr1) (40b)
= I(r2Z
m;En|Cr1) (40c)
≥ 0, (40d)
where
• (40c) stems from the Markov chain En −
− (Cr1r2rp)−

− (ZmK2); and,
• (40d) is due to the non-negativity of mutual information.
Inequality (39) may then be lower bounded as
H(K|CEnZm)
≥ n
[
I(V ;A|UE)−Rk1 +Rk −R2 +Rf
− (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q)− ε′′
]
(41a)
≥ n
(
Rk − ε
′′
)
, (41b)
where the last inequality holds if
Rk1 +R2 −Rf ≤ I(V ;A|UE)− (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q) . (42)
Finally,
E[Lk(C)] = I(K;E
nZm|C)
= H(K|C)−H(K|CEnZm)
≤ nε′′ ,
and the key is asymptotically secure.
G. Sufficient Conditions
Putting all pieces together, we have proved that the proposed
scheme allows the legitimate users to agree upon a key of rate
Rk, while keeping it secret from the eavesdropper if
R1 ≤ S1 ,
R2 ≤ S2 ,
Rp ≤ S2 −R2 ,
Rk1 ≤ S2 −R2 ,
Rk ≤ Rk1 +Rk2 ,
3Remark 14 assures that the indices r1, r2, and rp are distributed almost
uniformly, a condition that is necessary to invoke the result from the wiretap
channel setting.
10
Rf < (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q)− ǫf ,
S1 > I(U ;A) + ǫ1 ,
S2 > I(V ;A|U) + ǫ2 ,
Rp +Rk2 +Rf < (η + ǫ)I(T ;Y )− δ −R1 −R2 ,
Rp +Rk2 +Rf < (η + ǫ)I(T ;Y |Q)− δ ,
S1 −R1 < I(U ;B)− δ ,
S2 −R2 −Rp < I(V ;B|U)− δ ,
S2 < H(A)− ξ ,
S1 −R1 < I(U ;E)− δ ,
S2 −R2 −Rk1 +Rf < I(V ;E|U) + (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q)− δ
′,
Rp +Rf > (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q) + ε1 ,
Rk1 +R2 −Rf ≤ I(V ;A|UE)− (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q) .
After applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination to this set of
inequalities and taking (n,m) → ∞, we obtain (8) subject
to the conditions (9) and
I(T ;Z|Q) ≤ I(T ;Y |Q) , (43a)
I(U ;A|E) ≤ η I(Q;Y ) , (43b)
I(U ;A|E) + I(V ;A|UB) ≤ η I(T ;Y ) . (43c)
The achievable region Rin is the convex hull of the union of
this region over all joint probability distributions p ∈ P , where
the elements of P are defined in (16). We show next that the
same achievable region is obtained by the convex hull of the
union of the region defined by (8) and (9) over all p ∈ P ;
therefore we prefer this more compact version.
The conditions (43b) and (43c) are redundant whenever
I(U ;B) ≤ I(U ;E), whereas if (U, V ) ∼ p(u, v) are such
that I(U ;B) > I(U ;E) while satisfying (9) and (43), we see
that
I(V ;B)− I(V ;E)
= I(V ;B|U)− I(V ;E|U) + I(U ;B)− I(U ;E)
> I(V ;B|U)− I(V ;E|U) .
This implies that a larger achievable secret key rate is obtained
with U = ∅ and V ∼ p(v) =
∑
u p(u, v), which still
satisfies (9) and (43). Similarly, we see that if (Q, T ) are such
that I(T ;Z|Q) > I(T ;Y |Q) while satisfying (9) and (43),
η
[
I(T ;Y |Q)− I(T ;Z|Q)
]
+ I(V ;B|U)− I(V ;E|U)
< I(V ;B|U)− I(V ;E|U) .
This implies that the achievable secret key rate is increased by
choosing Q = T , which still satisfies (9) and (43). Therefore,
the conditions (43) are redundant after the maximization and
may be discarded.
We have shown thus far that, averaged over all possible
codebooks, the probability of error (1), the key leakage (2), and
the uniformity of the keys (3) become negligible as (n,m)→
∞ if the conditions (8) and (9) hold true. Nonetheless, by
applying the selection lemma [37, Lemma 2.2], we may
conclude that there exists a specific sequence of codebooks
such that the probability of error, the key leakage, and the
uniformity of the keys tend to zero as (n,m)→∞.
The bounds on the cardinality of the alphabets U , V , Q, and
T follow from Fenchel–Eggleston–Carathe´odory’s theorem
and the standard cardinality bounding technique [34, Appendix
C]; therefore their proof is omitted. This concludes the proof
of Theorem 2.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this work, we investigated the problem of secret key
generation over a noisy channel in presence of correlated
sources (independent of the main channel) at all terminals.
We introduced a novel coding scheme using separate source
and channel components –which shares common roots with
our previous works [32], [33]. With the use of two description
layers on the source observed at the encoder, this scheme
improves upon the existing works in the literature which only
rely on one layer of description.
The corresponding achievable secret key rate was shown to
be optimal for all classes of less-noisy sources and channels
(Propositions 1, 2, and 3). In Section IV, we compared the per-
formance of the proposed scheme with a previously reported
result for a simple binary model. Numerical computation of
the corresponding bounds provided interesting insights on the
regimes where the novel scheme outperforms the previous one.
This work, however, does not address the scenario where the
sources and the noisy channel are correlated. The extension
of the above mentioned result of Prabhakaran et al. [15] by
using two description layers is a natural consequence. Indeed,
this extension –posterior to the short version of the present
work in [1]– has been recently addressed in [27]. Using two
description layers as introduced here, the proposed achievable
scheme recovers the present inner bound for η = 1 provided
that the sources are independent of the channel.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1 (OUTER BOUND)
The outer bound is derived by following similar steps to
those in [33, Thm. 4], which assumed η = 1. It is reproduced
here for completeness.
Let (η,Rk) be an achievable tuple according to Definition 2,
and ǫ > 0. Then, there exists a (2nRk , n,m) secret key code
cn with functions ϕ(·), ψa(·), and ψb(·) such that
Xm = ϕ(An, Rr) , (44a)
K = ψa(A
n, Rr) , (44b)
Kˆ = ψb(B
n, Y m) , (44c)
that verify
m
n
≤ η + ǫ , (45a)
Pr
{
K 6= Kˆ
}
≤ ǫ , (45b)
I(K;EnZm) ≤ nǫ , (45c)
nRk −H(K) ≤ nǫ , (45d)
where we have dropped the conditioning on the codebook cn
from (45b)–(45d) and all subsequent calculations for clarity.
Before continuing, we present the following remark that is
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useful to establish Markov chains between the random vari-
ables.
Remark 15: From the fact that random variables Ai, Bi, Ei
are independent across time and the channel X 7→ (Y, Z)
is memoryless, the joint distribution of (K,An, Bn, En,
Xm, Y m, Zm) can be written as follows. For each i ∈ [1 : n]
and each j ∈ [1 : m], we have
p(k, an, bn, en, xm, ym, zm)
= p(ai−1, bi−1, ei−1) p(ai, bi, ei) p(a
n
i+1, b
n
i+1, e
n
i+1)
p(k, xm|an) p(yj−1, zj−1|xj−1) p(yj , zj|xj)
p(ymj+1, z
m
j+1|x
m
j+1) , (46)
where Pϕ(x
m|an) =
∑
∀ k p(k, x
m|an) and Pψa(k|a
n) =∑
∀ xm p(k, x
m|an).
We may now carry on with the derivation of the outer bound.
First consider,
nRk ≤ H(K) + nǫ (47a)
= H(K|EnY m) + I(K;EnY m) + nǫ (47b)
≤ H(K|EnY m) + I(K;EnY m)
− I(K;EnZm) + 2nǫ (47c)
= H(K|EnY m) + I(K;Y m|En)
− I(K;Zm|En) + 2nǫ (47d)
≤ H(K|EnY m)−H(K|BnY m)
+ I(K;Y m|En)− I(K;Zm|En) + 3nǫ (47e)
= I(K;Bn|Y m)− I(K;En|Y m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rs
+ I(K;Y m|En)− I(K;Zm|En)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rc
+ 3nǫ , (47f)
where
• (47a) stems from the uniformity of the keys (45d);
• (47c) is due to the security condition (45c); and,
• (47e) follows from (44), (45b), and Fano’s inequality,
H(K|BnY m) ≤ nǫ.
We now study separately the “source” term Rs and the
“channel” term Rc. Hence,
Rs =
∑n
i=1
I(K;Bi|Y
mBi−1)− I(K;Ei|Y
mEni+1)
=
∑n
i=1
I(K;Bi|Y
mBi−1Eni+1)
− I(K;Ei|Y
mBi−1Eni+1) (48a)
=
∑n
i=1
I(Vi;Bi|Ui)− I(Vi;Ei|Ui) (48b)
= n[I(VJ ;BJ |UJJ)− I(VJ ;EJ |UJJ)] (48c)
= n[I(V ;B|U)− I(V ;E|U)] , (48d)
where
• (48a) is due to Csisza´r sum identity;
• (48b) follows from the definition of the auxiliary RVs
Ui = (Y
mBi−1Eni+1) and Vi = (KUi);
• (48c) introduces the auxiliary RV J uniformly distributed
over [1 : n] and independent of all the other variables;
and,
• (48d) stems from the definition of random variables U =
(UJJ), V = (VJJ), B = BJ , and E = EJ .
This establishes the “source” term in (47f) with auxiliary RVs
(U, V ) that satisfy the following Markov chain
Ui −
− Vi −
−Ai −
− (BiEi) . (49)
The first part of (49) is trivial given the definition Vi = (KUi),
whereas the second part follows from the i.i.d. nature of the
sources and that they are correlated to the main channel only
through the encoder’s input (44a), see (46),
(KY mBi−1Eni+1)−
−Ai −
− (BiEi) . (50)
The “channel” term Rc can be single-letterized similarly,
Rc = m[I(T ;Y |Q)− I(T ;Z|Q)] , (51)
where we first define the auxiliary RVs Qi = (E
nY i−1Zmi+1)
and Ti = (KQi), we then introduce the auxiliary RV L
uniformly distributed over [1 : m], and we finally define
Q = (QLL), T = (TLL), Y = YL, and Z = ZL. The
auxiliary RVs in this term, i.e., (Q, T ), satisfy the following
Markov chain
Qi −
− Ti −
−Xi −
− (YiZi) , (52)
where the nontrivial part is due to the memoryless property
of the channel and (44b), provided the joint probability distri-
bution satisfies (46). Since neither Q nor T appear on other
parts of the outer bound, we may expand Rc as
Rc = m
∑
q∈Q
pQ(q) [I(T ;Y |Q = q)− I(T ;Z|Q = q)] (53a)
≤ mmax
q∈Q
[I(T ;Y |Q = q)− I(T ;Z|Q = q)] (53b)
= m[I(T ⋆;Y )− I(T ⋆;Z)] , (53c)
where in the last step we choose auxiliary RV T ⋆ ∼ pT |Q(·|q).
Gathering (47), (48), (51), and (53), the rate of the secret
key writes
Rk ≤ I(V ;B|U)−I(V ;E|U)+
m
n
[
I(T ;Y )−I(T ;Z)
]
+3ǫ .
(54)
If we let (n,m)→∞ and take arbitrarily small ǫ, we obtain
the bound (5).
In order to obtain (6), we use the following Markov chain
that is a consequence of (44a), provided the joint probability
satisfies (46):
(BnEn)−
−An −
−Xm −
− (Y mZm) . (55)
Due to the data processing inequality, we have
I(An;Y m) ≤ I(Xm;Y m) ≤ mI(X ;Y ) , (56)
where in the last inequality we use the memoryless property
of the channel. Next, consider
I(An;Y m) = I(AnBn;Y m) (57a)
≥ I(An;Y m|Bn) (57b)
= I(An;KY m|Bn)− I(An;K|BnY m) (57c)
≥ I(An;KY m|Bn)− nǫ (57d)
≥ n[I(A;V |B)− ǫ] , (57e)
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where
• (57a) follows from the Markov chain (55); and,
• (57d) stems from H(K|BnY m) ≤ nǫ due to (44)
and (45b), and H(K|AnBnY m) ≥ 0.
For the last step, i.e., (57e), consider
I(KY m;An|Bn)
= I(KY m;AnEn|Bn) (58a)
=
∑n
i=1
I(KY m;AiEi|B
nAni+1E
n
i+1) (58b)
≥
∑n
i=1
I(KY mBi−1Eni+1;AiEi|Bi) (58c)
=
∑n
i=1
I(Vi;AiEi|Bi) (58d)
≥
∑n
i=1
I(Vi;Ai|Bi) (58e)
= n I(VJ ;AJ |BJJ) (58f)
= n I(VJJ ;AJ |BJ ) (58g)
= n I(V ;A|B) , (58h)
where
• (58a) stems from the Markov chain (BnEn)−
−An −
−
(KY m);
• (58c) follows from the sources being i.i.d., i.e., (AiEi)−

−Bi −
− (Bi−1Bni+1A
n
i+1E
n
i+1);
• (58d) is due to the auxiliary RV Vi = (KY
mBi−1Eni+1);
• (58f) introduces the auxiliary RV J uniformly distributed
over [1 : n] and independent of all the other variables;
• (58g) follows from the independence of J and (AJBJ);
and,
• (58h) stems from the definition of random variables V =
(VJJ), B = BJ , and A = AJ .
Putting (56) and (57) together, we obtain:
I(V ;A|B) ≤
m
n
I(X ;Y ) + ǫ , (59)
which gives the condition (6) as we let (n,m)→∞ and take
an arbitrarily small ǫ.
Although the definition of the auxiliary RVs (TUV ) used
in the proof makes them arbitrarily correlated, the bounds (5)
and (6) only depend on the marginal PDs p(tx) and p(uv|a).
Consequently, we can restrict the set of possible joint PDs
to (7), i.e., independent source and channel variables, and still
achieve the maximum.
The bound on the cardinality of the alphabets T , U , and V
follow from Fenchel–Eggleston–Carathe´odory’s theorem and
the standard cardinality bounding technique [34, Appendix C];
therefore their proof is omitted. This concludes the proof of
Theorem 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
For completeness, we first present the inner bound from [14,
Thm. 4] but rewritten using the notation of the present work:
Rk ≤ max
p(x)p(v|a)
{
I(V ;B)− I(V ;E) + η I(X ;Y |Z)
}
(60a)
subject to I(V ;A|B) ≤ η I(X ;Y ) . (60b)
In the sequel, we assume η = 1.
The main channel in the system model depicted in Fig. 2a
is not only degraded but also Y equals X ; thus, the last term
on the r.h.s. of (60a) may be expanded as follows
I(X ;Y |Z) = H(X |Z) = H(X) +H(Z|X)−H(Z) . (61)
Since X is the input of a BSC of parameter ζ and output Z ,
it is clear that
I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ H(Z|X) = h2(ζ) , (62)
with equality if and only if X ∼ B
(
1
2
)
. Moreover, this choice
of X maximizes the r.h.s. of (60b) and makes the condition
redundant:
I(V ;A|B) ≤ H(A|B) = βH(A) = β ≤ 1 = H(X) , (63)
given that A ∼ B
(
1
2
)
and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
It remains to be determined what the maximizing value of
the first two terms on the r.h.s. of (60a) is. Let us first assume
that B is more capable than E, i.e., 0 ≤ β < h2(ǫ) according
to Remark 12. Then, we may write
I(V ;B)− I(V ;E)
= I(A;B)− I(A;E)−
[
I(A;B|V )− I(A;E|V )
]
≤ I(A;B)− I(A;E) (64a)
= H(A|E)−H(A|B) (64b)
= h2(ǫ)− β , (64c)
where the inequality is due to I(A;B|V ) ≥ I(A;E|V ) for all
p(v, a) given the more capable assumption. The bound (64)
holds with equality if and only if V = A. We also note
that (64) is a monotonically decreasing function of β and it
is zero when β = h2(ǫ). For β > h2(ǫ), the bound (64)
is no longer valid; however, we can rightfully argue that as
Bob’s source degrades while Eve’s remains the same, it is not
possible to obtain more secret bits from the sources than for
β = h2(ǫ). Therefore, for β > h2(ǫ),
I(V ;B)− I(V ;E) ≤ 0 , (65)
which holds with equality if and only if V = ∅.
Combining (60), (62), (64), and (65), we obtain the bound
in (14). This concludes the proof of Proposition 5.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
According to the encoding procedure detailed in Sec-
tion V-B, the index S is chosen uniformly among all the jointly
typical codewords or, if there is no jointly typical codeword,
uniformly on the whole codebook. We may thus characterize
pSc(1) as
pSc(1) =
∑
an∈T n
δ
(A)
p(an)
Pr{T nδ (A)}
Υan , (66)
where
Υan =
ν1
1 +
∑|S|
i=2 νi
+ |S|−1
|S|∏
i=1
(1 − νi) , (67)
13
and νi is the event that the codeword v
n(i) is jointly typical
with the source sequence an, i.e.,
νi , 1
{
vn(i) ∈ T nδ (V |u
n, an)
| vn(i) ∈ T nδ (V |u
n), un ∈ T nδ (U |a
n)
}
. (68)
The first term in (67) distributes the probability of each
sequence an ∈ T nδ (A) uniformly among all the jointly typical
codewords, while the second term in (67) distributes this
probability uniformly among all codewords in S, given that
no one was jointly typical with an. It is not hard to see that
the expected value of νi is
EC [νi] =
|T nδ (V |u
n, an)|
|T nδ (V |u
n)|
, γ , (69)
for some (un, an) ∈ T nδ (UA).
The expected value of (66) depends on the behavior of
Υan . Each νi is a Bernoulli RV with EC [νi] = γ and it is
independent of the other νi’s. Let us define
ν =
∑|S|
i=2
νi , (70)
then ν is a Binomial RV, and thus, for j ∈ [0 : |S| − 1],
pν(j) =
(
|S| − 1
j
)
γj(1− γ)|S|−1−j . (71)
After some manipulations, it is possible to show that
EC
[
1
1 + ν
]
=
1− (1− γ)|S|
γ |S|
. (72)
Hence,
EC [Υan ] = EC

 ν1
1 + ν
+
1
|S|
|S|∏
i=1
(1− νi)

 = 1
|S|
, (73)
and consequently, the expected value of (66) is
EC [pSc(1)] = EC [Υan ] = |S|
−1 . (74)
Noting that Υan and Υan′ are independent variables given
different sequences an and an′, and that (Υan)
2 ≤ Υan , we
obtain
EC [(pSc(1))
2] ≤ 2−n[H(A)−ξ]|S|−1 + |S|−2 , (75)
for some ξ > 0. Therefore,
Var[pSc(1)] ≤ 2
−n[H(A)−ξ]|S|−1 , (76)
and in view of Chebyshev’s inequality,
Pr
{∣∣pSc(1)− |S|−1∣∣ ≥ ε1 |S|−1} ≤ ε−21 2−n[H(A)−ξ]|S|
= ε−21 2
−n[H(A)−S2−ξ] .
This probability converges exponentially fast towards zero if
S2 < H(A)− ξ. This concludes the proof of Lemma 1.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Let us modify the problem definition and then extend the
scheme of Theorem 2 by introducing two virtual users who
observe the source sequence En. The first user has access to
the index r1 as side information and we require that it decodes
the codeword Un. On the other hand, the second user has
access to a different side information (which contains Un)
and we require that it decodes the codeword V n. The keen
reader can immediately see that we may bound the entropies
in the statement of the lemma using Fano’s inequality if the
probability of error at the virtual users tend to zero.
Before proceeding, we note that the entropy in (34b) has
(Zm,K2) in the conditioning. These variables are related to
the channel and they affect the entropy of the source-related
variable V n through the knowledge they provide about the
index rp. In the sequel, we first characterize the decrease on the
entropy of rp and we then proceed to analyze the probability
of error of the virtual users.
Let us introduce the random variable Υ, such that
Υ , 1{(Qm, Zm) ∈ T mδ (QZ)} . (77)
Then, using the binary variable Υ, it follows that
H(V n|CEnZmUnr2K1K2)
≤ 1 +H(V n|CEnZmUnr2K1K2Υ)
≤ 1 +H(V n|CEnZmUnr2K1K2,Υ = 1) + nS2δ , (78)
where the last inequality is due to H(V n|CUn) ≤ nS2 and
Pr{Υ = 0} ≤ δ.
In order to bound (78), we observe that, although rp ∈
[1 : 2nRp ], the index has only a non-zero probability in a
smaller subset of indices given the conditioning on Zm, r1
(known through Un and C), r2, K2, and Υ = 1. For a specific
codebook cn (which defines the codewords q
m(·) and tm(·)),
a channel output zm, and the indices r1, r2, and k2, let us
define the set of possible indices rp as
SR , {rp : t
m(r1, r2, rp, k2, rf ) ∈ T
m
δ (T |q
m(r1, r2), z
m)
for some rf} . (79)
In principle, the size of this set depends on the particular
codebook, channel output, and indices chosen. However, for
sufficiently large n, the following lemma shows that the
cardinality of SR is close to its mean value for almost all
codebooks.
Lemma 4: Let ε1, ε5, ε6 > 0, and let χ be a function of the
codebook cn, the sequence z
m, and the indices r1, r2, and k2
(not shown explicitly) defined as
χ(cn, z
m) ,
1
{∣∣SR − [Rp +Rf − (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q)]∣∣ ≥ ε5} , (80)
where SR ,
1
n
log |SR| and the set SR is defined in (79). Then,
Pr{χ(C, Zm) = 1} ≤ ε6 for sufficiently large n if Rp+Rf >
(η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q) + ε1.
Proof: See Appendix D-A.
14
We may thus write,
H(V n|CEnZmUnr2K1K2,Υ = 1)
≤ H(V n|CEnZmUnr2K1K2,Υ = 1, χ = 0)
+ nS2ε6 , (81a)
= H(V n|CEnZmUnr2K1K2,Υ = 1, rp ∈ SR, χ = 0)
+ nS2ε6 , (81b)
≤ H(V n|CEnUnr2K1, rp ∈ SR, χ = 0) + nS2ε6 , (81c)
where
• (81a) follows from H(V n|CUn) ≤ nS2 and Lemma 4,
where χ denotes χ(C, Zm); and,
• (81b) is due to rp ∈ SR being a function of (C, Zm, r1,
r2,K2,Υ = 1).
In light of (81c), we define the side information of the sec-
ond virtual user as (un(s1), r2, k1, rp ∈ SR). According to the
random codebook generation procedure, the number of code-
words V n(·) in a particular sub-bin B˜2 is |B˜2(s1, r2, rp)| =
2n(S2−R2−Rp); thus, conditioned on (un(s1), r2, rp ∈ SR, χ =
0), there are at most∑
rp∈SR
|B˜2(s1, r2, rp)| = 2
log |SR|2n(S2−R2−Rp)
≤ 2n[S2−R2+Rf−(η+ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q)+ε5]
distinct codewords V n(·). These codewords will be evenly
distributed in the sub-bins B¯2, given the symmetry of the
random codebook generation and the independence in the
creation of the sub-bins B˜2 and B¯2, if
Rk1 < S2 −R2 +Rf − (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q) + ε5 . (82)
The reader may verify that this is true due to (18) and (42).
Therefore, using the side information (un(s1), r2, k1, rp ∈
SR), the second virtual user can construct a set of possible
codewords V n(·) defined as
SV ,
⋃
rp∈SR
B˜2(s1, r2, rp) ∩ B¯2(s1, r2, k1) , (83)
where the number of codewords is at most
|SV | ≤ 2
n[S2−R2−Rk1+Rf−(η+ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q)+ε5] . (84)
We are finally ready to state the modified problem definition.
Let virtual user 1 decode the codeword un(s1) ∈ B1(r1) using
the source sequence en, i.e., it looks for the unique index
s1 ≡ sˆ1 such that un(sˆ1) ∈ B1(r1) and
(un(sˆ1), e
n) ∈ T nδ (UE) . (85)
The probability of error in decoding is arbitrarily small as
n→∞ if
S1 −R1 < I(U ;E)− δ
′ . (86)
On the other hand, let virtual user 2 decode the codeword
vn(s1, s2) ∈ SV using the source sequence en, i.e., it looks
for the unique index s2 ≡ sˆ2 such that vn(s1, sˆ2) ∈ SV and
(vn(s1, sˆ2), e
n) ∈ T nδ (V E|u
n(s1)) . (87)
The probability of error in decoding is arbitrarily small as
n→∞ if
S2 −R2 −Rk1 +Rf − (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q) + ε5
< I(V ;E|U)− δ′ . (88)
To sum up, if (86) and (88) hold true, the probability of
error in decoding at the virtual users is arbitrarily small as
n→∞. Therefore, using Fano’s inequality, we have
H(Un|CEnr1) ≤ nǫn , (89a)
H(V n|CEnUnr2K1, rp ∈ SR, χ = 0) ≤ nǫn , (89b)
where ǫn denotes a sequence such that ǫn → 0 as n → ∞.
Joining (78), (81), and (89), we recover the statement of the
lemma. This concludes the proof of Lemma 2.
A. Proof of Lemma 4
Before analyzing the set of possible indices rp, let us first
concentrate on characterizing the set of possible codewords
tm(·). Since the indices r1, r2, and k2 are fixed, there are
only 2n(Rp+Rf ) codewords to choose from. Moreover, given
a specific codebook cn generated according to the procedure
from Section V-A, the indices r1 and r2 fix the codeword
qm(r1, r2); thus, we simplify the notation and the codebook
is composed of qm ∈ T mδ (Q) and t
m(r) ∈ T mδ (T |q
m), where
r ∈ [1 : 2n(Rp+Rf )]. The set ST of possible codewords tm(r)
is then defined as
ST , {t
m(r) : tm(r) ∈ T mδ (T |q
m, zm)} . (90)
Then, according to the random codebook generation,
ECZm [|ST |] =
2n(Rp+Rf )∑
r=1
ECZm [1{T
m(r) ∈ T mδ (T |q
m, zm)}]
= 2n(Rp+Rf−α) , (91)
where,
2−nα , Pr{Tm(1) ∈ T mδ (T |q
m, zm)} =
|T mδ (T |q
m, zm)|
|T mδ (T |q
m)|
,
for some (qm, zm) ∈ T mδ (QZ). The value of α may be
bounded using standard bounds for the cardinality of typical
sets, yielding
(η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q)− ε1 ≤ α ≤ (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q) + ε1 , (92)
for some ε1 > 0.
Similarly, we may calculate
ECZm [|ST |
2] = 22n(Rp+Rf−α) + 2n(Rp+Rf−α)(1− 2−nα) ,
and finally,
Var[|ST |] ≤ 2
n(Rp+Rf−α) . (93)
We may now use Chebyshev’s inequality to bound the value
of |ST |,
Pr
{∣∣|ST | − ECZm [|ST |]∣∣ ≥ ε2 ECZm [|ST |]}
≤ ε−22 2
−n(Rp+Rf−α) , (94)
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for some ε2 > 0. This probability tends to zero exponentially
fast with n if Rp +Rf > (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q) + ε1. Taking the
logarithm in the argument of the probability of (94) we obtain
Pr
{∣∣∣∣ 1n log |ST | − β
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε3
}
≤ ε4 , (95)
for some ε3 ≥ ε1 +
1
n
log(1 + ε2) and ε4 ≥ ε
−2
2 2
−n(β−ε1),
where
β , Rp +Rf − (η + ǫ)I(T ;Z|Q) . (96)
We note that (95) provides an estimate on the second virtual
receiver’s uncertainty on the actual transmitted codeword
Tm(·), i.e., the set ST , rather than the index rp, i.e., the set
SR. In order to bound the latter, consider the following
ECZm [log |SR|]
≤ ECZm
[
log |SR|
∣∣|SR| ≤ 2n(β+ε3)]+ nRpε4 (97a)
≤ n(β − ε5)ps + n(β + ε3)(1− ps) + nRpε4 (97b)
= n[β + ε3 + ε4Rp − ps(ε3 + ε5)] , (97c)
where
• (97a) follows from having at most 2nRp indices rp,
the fact that |SR| ≤ |ST | (e.g. some indices might be
repeated), and (95); and,
• (97b) is due to the definition ps , Pr
{
|SR| ≤ 2
n(β−ε5)
}
,
for some ε5 > 0.
On the other hand, consider the following lower bound derived
from (38):
ECZm [log |SR|] ≥ H(rp|CZ
mr1r2K2) ≥ n(β − ε
′) , (98)
where the first inequality is due to the definition of the set SR
in (79) and the fact that the uniform distribution maximizes
the entropy. Joining (97) and (98) we obtain,
ps ≤
ε′ + ε3 + ε4Rp
ε3 + ε5
< ε6 , (99)
where the last inequality holds if ε5 ≫ max{ε′, ε3, ε4Rp}. For
a sufficiently large n, it is always possible to find such a ε5.
Finally, the lemma’s statement is recovered using (95) (jointly
with the fact that |SR| ≤ |ST |) and (99). This concludes the
proof of Lemma 4.
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